Mar 22, 2010

The concept of God and evil are incompatible


The age old question: Is the concept of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God compatible with evil?  It has been debated amongst theists and atheists for centuries. I have been participating in a little debate on the subject myself recently. Despite my repeated attempts to reach some type of consensus, my opponent repeatedly dodged my questions, and when one issue was addressed another sprung up, until, he finally directed me to the author of his beliefs: William Lane Craig. Craig is a philosopher who is also a Christian who argues in favor of Gods existence. The essay i was directed to was called The Problem Of Evil, and is a Theist response to the "age old question". I would recommend that you read through the seemingly convincing argument put forth by Craig, before reading my reply. However, i have set up this post as a imaginary dialog between myself and Craig, so the basics are here. Anyone who disagrees with my representation of William Craig's position, can check the essay, and offer a correction in the comment section at the bottom of this rebuttal. 


The point of Craig's essay was to address the apparent inconsistency between the nature of God and the amount of evil in the world. He argues that there is no inconsistency. The first point of my rebuttal posted here is to show that William Craig's arguments are flawed. The second is to show nature of the "intellectual wall" between the theist and the atheist. Some of you may be familiar with the concept of this "wall", it springs up every time one side makes a valid point, and the other seems to continue debating in circles as if nothing worthwhile was said. The points that are so compelling for the atheist, seem like trivial rhetoric to the theist, and visa versa. I have spent a significant amount of time studying Craig's position, which seems to encapsulate the theist position very well. I think i have pin-pointed the cause of this intellectual barrier between us. I have tried to addressed it throughout my rebuttal, and is summarized in my conclusion.

Craig breaks the issue of God and Evil into two separate arguments: The logical argument and the probabilistic argument
1.       Logical argument
The logical argument is one put forward by the atheist stating that God and evil are so contrary to each other that there is not one conceivable scenario where the two are compatible.  Therefore, in order to defeat the Logical Argument the theist need only present one valid scenario where the two concepts are consistent with each other.
Here are the premises:
1.                   An omnipotent , omnibenevolent  God exist
2.                   Evil exist
Statement (2) is agreed by both theist and atheist
Statement (1) is the statement being tested for consistency and is implying:

1a. If God is omnipotent then he can create any world which He desires.
1b. If God is omnibenevolent, then, He prefers a world without evil over a world with evil.

It is further implied by the atheist that because evil does exist, God must have chose to create a world with evil in it over other options where evil did not exist, and therefore He is not omnibenevolent

Theist defense of the logical argument

Argument 1a is assumed true for the sake of argument, pointing out that God cannot create logical impossibilities such as creating an irresistible force as well as an immovable object.  Such things are logically impossible and God is not required to have the ability to ‘create’ said impossibilities in order to retain his omnipotent nature. For the sake of argument this is granted. The theist will then proceed to invoke the Free Will Defense.

“Thus, if God grants people genuine freedom to choose as they like, then it is impossible for Him to guarantee what their choices will be.  All He can do is create the circumstances in which a person is able to make a free choice and then, so to speak, stand back and let him make that choice.  Now what that implies is that there are worlds which are possible in and of themselves, but which God is incapable of creating. ………..Suppose, then, that in every feasible world where God creates free creatures some of those creatures freely choose to do evil.  In such a case, it is the creatures themselves who bring about evil, and God can do nothing to prevent their doing so, apart from refusing to actualize any such worlds.  Thus it is possible that every world feasible for God which contains free creatures is a world with sin and evil.”

This is usually granted as a consistent explanation for evil resulting from free will. I have admitted this in our discussion. Evil resulting from free will is not an issue for me and so I have no reply to this argument.

Justification for the existence of natural evils #1
William Lane Craig’s explanation for natural evil is demonic activity, citing that God could not exclude free will from demons due to reasons stated in the Free Will Defense. Craig is stating that demons could be out there tampering with reality, thus it is possible that they are cause of natural evil.

Here is my reply to demonic activity as an explanation of natural evil:

 The argument that evil and God are inconsistent ideas are based on two premises: 
1.       An omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exist
2.       Evil exist.
The argument does NOT allow for:
1.       An omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exist
2.       Evil exist
3.       Free will demons exist and can manipulate matter and influence reality

However, if you would like to suggest that such a hypothetical demon concept is valid for defeating the logical argument. (REMEMBER that one must only offer one valid scenario to defeat the argument even if it is as far-fetched as demons. Craig reminds us not to confuse the Logical Argument with the Probabilistic Argument.) Then I will offer a far-fetched counter premise: 

4.       Whenever a demon is present, there is a different mythological creature of my choice, which exists and continually defuses demons by preventing their activity. 

But what is this ad hoc type of reasoning? It is ridiculous at best, you may try and appeal to an authority like the Bible and say “look it says here that demons exist.”  I would first respond by pointing out that we have not established the validity of the Bible. Second, the premises were established as a guideline for the debate. They were made clear by Craig at the beginning of his essay. If the premises were 1, 2, and 3, we would have a whole different can of worms to discuss.   I will allow premise #1 for a philosophical discussion, it is arguable. I will allow that #2: evil does exist in this world.  I think that can be agreed without a doubt by both sides of this debate. However, I will not allow #3 without an entirely separate discussion. I think this is a fatal error on the side of Craig, because if we are free to introduce new premises, we could continually counter each other with unproven concepts infinitely, like some elementary kids playing pretend super-heroes:  “Ya well my hero has freeze powers, ya well mine has anti-freeze….” and so on.  I think that at this point (without invoking some far-fetched concept) the Logical Argument has demonstrated that the idea of Gods omnipotence and omnibenevolence are incompatible with the natural evil in this world.

Justification for the existence of natural evil #2

Craig suggests the same argument which Dr. Geisler illustrated in his interview. The argument is: what might seem like evil, could possibly turn out as good after a series of subsequent cause and effect results.  If God has a good purpose for wiping out Haitians or some other group, that purpose may not be actualized for a hundred years.  Since we are finite beings, we cannot prove otherwise.  One would have to be omniscient to know what God knows.  Disproving such a claim would involve disproving every possible cause and effect scenario that results from a natural evil, and demonstrate that the resulting ‘good’ never surpassed the resulting ‘evil’…..ever.  On this note we are again injecting an additional premise that states God is omniscient.  I will accept it, since the concept is often associated with the nature of God. 

Here is my reply to Gods omniscience as an explanation of natural evil:

 Here I will concede.  I have no way to disprove such a claim. I will admit that I see no way show that an event is evil if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Thus the Logical argument is defeated if Gods omniscience is allowed.  However don’t get too excited, defeating the logical argument only shows that a single scenario is possible with the existence of evil.  Such a ‘win’ states nothing about the probability of it being true.  One can make several claims about reality that are ultimately irrefutable, yet at the same time are highly improbable to be true.  We do not establish beliefs based on a possibility, we establish them based on probability.  This brings us to the next argument.

2.  Probabilistic argument
The probabilistic argument is one that states that even if God + Evil are shown to be possible, they are still improbable. In William Craig’s own words:
“When we consider the probabilistic problem of evil, however, things are not so easy.  For even though the account of evil given above is possible, still it seems wildly improbable. Explaining all natural evil as the result of demonic activity, for example, seems ridiculous.  And could not God reduce the evil in the world without reducing the good?  The world is filled with so many seemingly pointless or unnecessary evils that it seems doubtful that God could have any sort of morally sufficient reason for permitting them.  Accordingly, it might be argued 
that given the evil in the world, it is improbable, even if not impossible, that God exists.”

Craig then goes on to lay out four separate ways to account for the apparent improbability that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God could exist. I will address them as arguments A, B, C, and D.

A.    Evil is relative to the background information of the objector

1.     “Thus, with a probability argument, we have to ask:  probable with respect to what? To give an illustration: suppose that Joe is a college student.  Suppose, further, that 90 percent of college students drink beer. With respect to that information, it is highly probable that Joe drinks beer. But suppose we find out that Joe is a Biola University student and that 90 percent of Biola students do not drink beer. Suddenly the probability of Joe's being a beer drinker has changed dramatically!  The point is that probabilities are relative to the background information one considers.”

My Reply:

The background information is not relevant here; we are all members of the same existence on planet earth. Everyone’s background is the same. The evil in this world is the same for all.  If Craig were to ask me:  probable with respect to what? I would reply: probable when compared to the amount of evil on planet earth. He implies that there are other places, where the evil might be less, and thus, such a place might show a probability in favor of God’s omnibenevolence.  We only have one place to gather our background information, and it is with respect to everyone on planet earth.

2.       “Now apply this principle to the probabilistic problem of evil. The objector claims to prove that God's existence is improbable.  But with respect to what? To the evil in the world?  If that is all the background information one considers, then it is hardly surprising if God's existence should appear improbable relative to that alone.  Indeed, it would be a major philosophical achievement if theists could demonstrate that relative to the evil in the world alone, God's existence is not improbable. But the Christian theist  need not be committed to such an arduous task. He will insist that we consider, not just the evil in the world, but all the evidence relevant to God's existence, including the cosmological argument for a Creator of the universe, the teleological argument for an intelligent Designer of the cosmos”….etc….etc

My Reply:

Here we have a discussion based on a premise, specifically:  Is the nature of God probable based on the amount of evil that we observe. To my astonishment Craig concedes the whole argument to the atheist by saying basically this: 

If we test God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence against the concept of evil, then, of course God’s existence seems improbable
.
Even though the concept has passed the test of the logical argument, by simply showing that such a thing is possible, upon having to further prove that it is probable, William Craig concedes that it seems improbable. Now you may think that I am quoting out of context here, but honestly Craig’s only defense is the inclusion of several other arguments that are not established. Again he can only get out of a terrible inconsistency by including additional premises. He IS stating that based on the Probabilistic Argument alone the existence of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God seems improbable.

My Response:

 I agree.

Craig Responds:

 “Relative to the background information of human reproductive biology, one's own personal existence is astronomically improbable. Yet there is nothing irrational about believing both the facts of human reproductive biology and that one exists.  Similarly, if one is warranted in believing that God exists, then there is no problem occasioned by the fact that this belief is improbable relative to the evil in the world.”

My Reply:

This is a poor analogy. First off, the discussion has not led us to a warranted belief in God.  In fact, this discussion has shown the concept to be improbable.  Second, given the facts of human reproduction, it is certainly probable that someone will exist. Yet if I were to claim that anyone specific person was going to be born, based on the incalculable factors of millions of sperm, each with different genetic information, I would be irrational. In this analogy the theist is claiming that despite incalculable odds against; a specific type of person will be born. 
An omnibenevolent and omnipotent God, that is compatible with the amount of evil in this world, has been admitted to be improbable. The only defense to justify believing in an improbable concept is a poor analogy where the variables are misplaced.

B.    Humans have a poor vantage point for assessing Gods actions or judgment.

“As finite persons, we are limited in space and time, in intelligence and insight.  But the transcendent and sovereign God sees the end of history from its beginning and providentially orders history so that His purposes are ultimately achieved through human free decisions.  In order to achieve His ends God may well have to put up with certain evils along the way.  Evils which appear pointless or unnecessary to us within our limited framework may be seen to have been justly permitted from within God's wider framework.” 

This is the same concept that defeated the logical argument. We are finite, and do not know the full scope of God’s plan. He sees the end from the beginning…etc. We are not omniscient and cannot know the end results of some apparent evil, which may manifest into a great good in the future. Craig uses a bit of science to demonstrate the validity of such a concept:

“To borrow an illustration from a developing field of science, Chaos Theory, scientists have discovered that certain macroscopic systems, for example, weather systems or insect populations, are extraordinarily sensitive to the tiniest perturbations.  A butterfly fluttering on a branch in West Africa may set in motion forces which would eventually issue in a hurricane over the Atlantic Ocean.  Yet it is impossible in principle for anyone observing that butterfly palpitating on a branch to predict such an outcome. “

My Reply:

If I go around town squashing butterflies with the belief that I am preventing hurricanes, I am likely to be locked up in a rubber room.  Though this concept is possible, it is not rational, and low probability concepts are not useful for forming educated belief systems. By believing that an earthquake which kills thousands will manifest into some tremendous good that surpasses the evil contribution, you are essentially squashing butterflies.  It is possible that God used a disaster for some greater good that is unseen by our finite minds, but it is not probable. Nor is it likely that the butterfly I squashed yesterday was going to spawn an air current that would have destroyed a city. Craig has offered no argument to show such a concept is anything other than possible yet highly improbable.

This is a central theme in the intellectual barrier between theist and atheist. In every aspect of life we require more than just a possibility for supporting a belief, we require probability. Yet with regard to religious beliefs, just the possibility of a thing will suffice; it is an inconsistency that I cannot understand.

C.    Christian theism entails doctrines that increase the probability of the co-existence of God and evil

Arguing that bare bones theism is too easy to refute and Christian theism has some extra claims or truths which make the concept of God+evil more probable.

My reply:
I find it pointless to even establish a discussion based on premises, if those involved in the discussion will constantly invoke additional premises when the original two are shown to be inconsistent or improbable.  If the bible or demons or Gods omniscience are required to argue in favor of a world where God and Evil are compatible, such things need to be established prior to the discussion.  Otherwise if one is asked: “Is the concept of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God compatible with evil?  The reply should be: “No it is not compatible……..unless of course one can first establish that the bible is true, and demons exist and God is omniscient.” 

Craig’s Response: (in my own words)

'But if I factor in Christianity I can show a correlation between horrible events and conversion to Christianity, which would be a good thing because if more people are saved by accepting Christ than are killed in the horrible event, we have a “net good”. So a horrible event like the Chinese Cultural Revolution which killed 20 million, and spurred the largest conversion to Christianity maybe in history of 35-70 million converts; God has actually saved 15-50 million by allowing or causing this event to happen. Therefore, demonstrating how a seemingly bad thing can really be good if Christianity is factored in.'

My Reply:
We have already established the premises of the discussion, yet here again is the requirement of an addition. Let’s suppose for the sake of argument, even though it’s off topic, that death for a minority of people which allows the majority to prosper is a good thing. Is this concept acceptable in society? Could Barack Obama propose that we kill all the welfare recipients and criminals so that the majority of society could prosper?  Small price to pay to increase the “overall good” of society.  I hope that you find this suggestion appalling. It’s ridiculous and immoral in every regard, yet, for some reason unknown to me; an appalling concept applied to the Christian God mutates into omnibenevolence.

D.    God is unimaginable good

“………….imagines, as it were, a scale, in which all the suffering of this life is placed on one side, while on the other side is placed the glory which God will bestow upon His children in heaven. And the weight of glory is so great that it is beyond comparison with the suffering. For to know God, the locus of infinite goodness and love, is an incomparable good, the fulfillment of human existence.  The sufferings of this life cannot even be compared to it.  Thus, the person who knows God, no matter what he suffers, no matter how awful his pain, can still truly say, 'God is good to me!', simply in virtue of the fact that he knows God, an incommensurable good.

My Reply:

If I were to kill a child, then, stand in front of a Pastor and claim: “I have sent this child to the lord; I have done a good thing.”  Would you stand by me? Would you or any other Christian say:  “Though the child suffered greatly, it is with the lord now, and the death was more good than bad, we ought to thank this man.”  If good and evil were only assessed by a net total; Imagine how different would our morals and laws would be. Even with regard to Christianity: If I accepted the lord as my savior and led a good life in the eyes of God, for the first 90% of my life, then in the final 10% I denounced him and rejected him as my savior. Upon my death, would God judge and say: “well the net sum of your life was good, therefore you may pass into the gates of heaven” The Bible tells us no, I would burn.  This addition and subtraction ofGood and Evil is irrational when compared to real life scenarios, even when compared to hypothetical religious ones.  In all other areas of life we accept an evil deed at face value, and serve justice accordingly. Only when the notion of God, is evoked do we disregard all standards.

I understand the arguments that are put forward by William Craig; I simply find them inconsistent with logic and/or incompatible with beliefs in all other areas of life.Theist fail to explain why moral explanations have a double standard when God is involved, and the only comfort or rationalization from a theist is to go squash butterflies marvel at our ability to prevent hurricanes.

(Just in case that last analogy sounded ridiculous or a bit Reductio ad absurdum, imagine witnessing a disaster and marveling at the depth and complexity of God’s good plan.)

In conclusion
God has been shown to be possible, though time and time again, He has been shown to be improbable. The theist puts too much emphasis on possibility, the atheist emphasizes probability. The only outs appear to be through the unproven claims of scripture, invoking of mythological deities and demons, in conjunction with ad hoc premises.  Yet even these with these crutches and back up plans, the good nature of god stands in stark contradiction with beliefs that we accept and hold as valid in all other areas of life. Why does the theist find so much validity in a possibility? An argument seems to be valid only if the possibility shines a faint light on ones existing beliefs.  There is an intellectual wall between the Theist and the Atheist, its bricks are theistic possibilities, and its mortar is mixed with moral double standards.